Abstract-The rapid growth of inter-regional trading among electricity markets requires the development of new market-oriented mechanisms for the inter-regional congestion management of such trading. In this paper, we deal with the operation of power systems consisting of several interconnected electricity markets. We propose an alternative approach to inter-regional trade that avoids the flaws of forward markets with explicit auctioning of interconnections capacities. We propose the integration of a forward market with a balancing (spot) market for inter-regional exchanges based on nodal pricing. The interaction of transmission system operators (TSOs) belonging to adjacent markets is efficiently taken into account through a decentralized optimal power flow (OPF), which is solved by interior point methods.
Coordinated Spot Market for Congestion Management of Inter-Regional Electricity Markets I. INTRODUCTION
A S local electricity markets progressively mature, they are opening their borders to a broader degree of competition. This trend toward regional integration of electricity markets has fostered the creation of regional electricity markets. Inter-regional (interarea) trading plays an important role in achieving efficiency in energy and ancilliary services markets. Therefore, new trading arrangements are emerging and local markets are becoming increasingly integrated into regional markets worldwide.
The advantages of regional integration (i.e., scale of economies and sharing common resources), are widely recognized within the context of the European Union (EU) and North and Central America where several initiatives have already been launched [1] - [3] . However, associated with these initiatives, there is a lack of clear specification on harmonization requirements-defining key elements of market design. For instance, due to the great diversity in existing pricing structures in the EU, a real integrated electricity market requires further harmonization to avoid diverging national solutions, adverse to the internal market design and development [4] . Existing regional power exchanges such as the Nord Pool [5] or recent proposals in the Northeast U.S. and Canada [6] (which are based on a real compromise for a regional Manuscript received April 15, 2003 . J. Aguado is with the Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Málaga, Málaga E-29013, Spain (e-mail: jaguado@uma.es).
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TPWRS.2003.820693 market), have proposed forming a combined day-ahead market for the region as a whole.
There are certain pivotal problems that require a considerable amount of further specification for a inter-regional electricity market to be implemented; for instance, the methodologies for allocating the available interconnector capacity (congestion management) and inter-regional transmission pricing. Flawed approaches and models implemented to address these issues offer undesirable fluctuations in transmission prices creating an obstacle to trade. These issues are currently under an intense debate and efforts are being conducted to develop inter-regional congestion management methods [7] . The main difficulties associated with inter-regional trade appear in the coordination of several transmission system operators (TSOs). In this paper, a forward explicit auctioning of the interconnector capacities is assumed. We propose the combination of the forward market with a decentralized optimization-based mechanism to manage real-time inter-regional congestion where the interaction of adjacent TSOs is efficiently taken into account in order to achieve system-wide efficiency.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, inter-regional congestion management is motivated. In Section III, the transmission-constrained market model is described. A forward market for auctioning interconnector capacity is presented in Section IV. In Section V, a decentralized inter-regional spot market for congestion management is proposed. Finally, conclusions are presented.
II. INTER-REGIONAL CONGESTION MANAGEMENT
When the producers and consumers of energy in an electricity market desire to produce and consume in amounts that would cause the transmission system to operate at or beyond one or more transfer limits (thermal, voltage stability, or dynamic stability limits), the system is said to be congested. Congestion implies that some inexpensive generation may be unusable due to its location, making it necessary to utilize a more expensive unit in a different location. Congestion management, that is, controlling the transmission system so that transfer limits are observed, is perhaps the most fundamental transmission management problem in competitive electricity markets.
There is a universal lack of consensus on which model best addresses the problem of congestion management in electricity markets [8] , and has been addressed from different perspectives [9] - [12] . It is important to differentiate between temporary and structural bottlenecks when selecting methods of managing congestion [13] . The main methods to manage congestion are: explicit and implicit auctions, market splitting, counter-trading and redispatching. A review of these methods can be found in [13] .
0885-8950/04$20.00 © 2004 IEEE First attempts to address inter-regional congestion management have been based on nonmarket mechanisms such as first-come first-serve, pro rata, administrative curtailment, etc. [7] . In a competitive market, these rules should be substituted by market-oriented mechanisms. Two distinct approaches have been proposed for inter-regional congestion management: i) the nodal-based approach which relies in some type of OPF problem [14] , [15] ; and ii) the flowgate model approach that is based on the utilization of the transmission lines [12] , [16] .
In Europe, explicit auctioning of interconnector capacities is attracting interest [7] , although variations of implicit auctions (e.g., market splitting) are also working in the Nordpool [5] . Furthermore, financial instruments can be developed to hedge against congestion charges. Financial transmission rights have been established in the U.S. based on point-to-point transmission rights [14] or flowgate rights [12] .
Electricity markets are inherently incomplete [17] (i.e., current technology cannot operate real-time markets, thus the real-time dispatch of transmission and generation resources is best managed by a central operator). The minimum requirements of a market design for congestion management, as identified in [18] , should be locational (nodal) pricing, plus additional financial instruments for hedging. In an inter-regional context, the real-time congestion management problem becomes more complex as the operation of several TSOs must be coordinated. If there is no coordination among the TSOs involved in inter-regional trading, the dispatch for each system can only use the generation resources associated with that control area and, thus, it would probably not be the integrated optimal solution for the region as a whole [14] . Moreover, as each control area defines its own dispatch practices to determine nodal prices, these prices for each TSO area would not necessarily be consistent with neighboring TSOs nodal prices. Any approach for inter-TSO coordination should, therefore, provide a means to manage and price power trading on a regional basis. It is not likely that a very large TSO covering several regions will be implemented to perform all of these functions. Hence, there is a need for a nodal-based procedure that enables efficient inter-regional trading while not requiring all control areas to consolidate into a single area or, at least, neighboring areas must provide an interface (hub) nodal-price such that the inter-regional market can be coordinated, as well as, accommodate complementary financial instruments for transmission rights across regions.
III. TRANSMISSION-CONSTRAINED MARKET MODEL FOR CONGESTION MANAGEMENT
The main engine of the balancing coordinated spot market is an optimal power flow that manages the energy market. The description of this market follows.
A. Bid Supplier Model
The active and reactive generation cost functions are assumed convex quadratic functions of the active and reactive generation outputs, respectively; is the set of generation buses, and denotes its cardinality. These functions can be written as and where and , with ; and and , with are the coefficients of the first-order and second-order terms of the active and reactive cost functions, respectively.
Directly associated with the marginal cost functions are the supply functions of generators, defined as and , where is a matrix that defines the slopes of the linear supply functions with . The matrix of slopes determines the price at which generators are willing to supply; and is a vector of minimum price for supply with . Similar expressions are derived for the reactive power supply functions where and . The bid supply functions are sent to the system operator to perform a centralized dispatch. Under imperfect electricity markets (in practice, all of them), players with market power can strategically modify these bid functions to obtain advantage of their dominant position for different supply, demand, and network conditions. Along with energy bid functions, suppliers submit operational restrictions of their units. Generation units must be run taking into account operational limits regarding minimum and maximum power output; they are considered through inequalities constraints of the form
In practice, limits for the reactive power generation are difficult to set as they are state dependent. Equation (2) is a simplified model; however, by adjusting the actual limit values during the optimization process, real-world limits can be simulated with sufficient accuracy.
B. Bid Demand Model
The price responsiveness of a customer in an electricity market is, in many cases, low [19] . It is, however, very important for the development of competitive markets that consumers react to market prices (elastic load). Customers can curtail their consumption at times of high prices and, thus, reduce price spikes.
The benefit of active and reactive power consumption are modeled using nondecreasing concave functions. The vectors and are the active and reactive power demand where is the set of demand buses. The demand benefit functions can be expressed as and , where and , with ; and , , with are the coefficients of the firstorder and second-order terms of the active and reactive benefit function, respectively. The derivatives of the benefits functions with respect to the power demand are usually called the inverse demand functions. Similarly, as for the bid supply function, the bid demand function for consumers can be defined as and , where is a matrix that defines the slopes of the linear demand functions with . The matrix of slopes determines the price at which consumers are willing to buy, and is a vector of maximum price for demand, with . Similar expressions can be derived for the reactive power supply functions, where and . Consumers with no demand elasticity ( , ) are characterized by a fixed power consumption regardless of the market price. Demand bidders with nonfirm (curtailable, or elastic) load submit to the system operator the percentage of dispatchable load of the total power consumption. In these cases, the dispatchable power consumption ( , ) is modeled as inequalities constraints, that is (3) (4) where and are diagonal matrices whose elements , are the fraction of dispatchable active and reactive load, respectively; and , denote the maximum active and reactive demand, respectively. Thus, the total consumption is (5) (6) where is an identity matrix.
C. Problem Formulation
The dispatch algorithm for the market results in an OPF problem as follows: (7) where is the benefit function associated with power demand, and is the cost of generation. The ac power flow balance equations are modeled through nonlinear equality constraints and maximum branch power flow and voltage magnitude limits are considered through inequality constraints . Even though reactive-related components are not usually managed together in the energy market, the reactive portions in the bid and demand functions are included in this model to show that if a particular market design may consider parallel markets for reactive-related services, they can be included within this formulation in a straightforward manner. 
IV. EXPLICIT AUCTIONING OF INTERCONNECTOR CAPACITY

A. Illustrative Example
For illustrative purposes, we develop the proposed congestion management approach using a simple electric power network based on the example proposed in [12] . The power network is shown in Fig. 1 .
The power system consists of two regions-system A and system B-operated by two transmission system operators and , respectively. There are three generation buses: bus 1, 2, and 4; and three demand buses: bus 3, 5, and 6. The producers willingness to generate is characterized by linear bid supply functions which, we assume, are directly associated with their marginal cost functions. Similarly, the willingness of consumers to buy power from the respective market is characterized by linear bid demand functions which are directly associated with their inverse demand functions. The market players' bid functions are displayed in Table I .
All transmission lines are modeled as lossless, with line reactances 0.01 p.u. Furthermore, the active power limits of tie-lines 1-6 and 2-5 are 200 and 250 MW, respectively. Additional power system data are displayed in Table II .
B. Forward Market
Assume that system A and system B are independently dispatched and there is no energy exchange at tie-lines. In the absence of losses and transmission constraints, the system marginal price (SMP) for system A is , and for system B, it is . Due to the large difference between both SMPs, consumers in system B would like to reduce their costs by importing cheaper energy from system A; and generators in system A would be willing to increase their revenues by an increment in their power output for exports. It is clear than transmitting power from region A to region B will increase the social welfare of the system as a whole-dispatching cheapest generation to supply more valuable load. Consumers in system B are willing to import energy until generation capacity is exhausted in system A and/or the price offered by system A equals the SMP of system B. This happens when power transmitted from A to B is 550 MW.
However, the capacity of tie-lines 1-6 (200 MW) and 2-5 (250 MW) cannot accommodate this power exchange. Since the interconnector capacity resources are scare, a mechanism is required to efficiently manage tie-line capacities. Different types of auctions can be organized [7] . Furthermore, they can be established on a yearly, monthly, weekly, or daily basis. For illustrative purposes, we assume a simple forward market applied to the auction of the tie-line capacities. Assume an auctioned capacity of . Generators 1 and 2 submit offers that are ordered as shown in Fig. 2 (we assume that bids for the forward market are characterized by pairs price-quantity). The clearing price is the price of the offer that is placed at . This clearing price must be paid by all participants whose offers are located to the left of . The offers located to the right of are not allowed to take part on the trade. There is an important flaw in the above market. Due to Kirchhoff's laws, the transmission capacity between system A and system B is not the sum of the individual capacities of the two tie-lines and even more, the optimal trade among the two systems does not coincide with the maximum flow capacity of the two tie lines. Therefore, the explicit auction of tie-lines capacity leads to a nonoptimal or even infeasible scheduling. Consequently, a coordinated balancing inter-regional spot market is required for real-time congestion management.
V. COORDINATED INTER-REGIONAL SPOT MARKET CONGESTION MANAGEMENT
The forward market can be completed with an inter-regional spot market to manage congestion. Our primary objective is to develop an algorithm that achieves system-wide efficiency and allows self-operation of interconnected TSOs. The main driver of this spot market is the so-called inter-regional transmission system coordinator (IRTC); this entity is in charge of coordination inter-regional trade and it has no access to proprietary information on neighboring markets. In this section, we show how optimization methods based on an interior point algorithm can be adapted to mimic a decentralized auction-like mechanism for the coordination of a spot market for inter-regional trade. Through an iterative process, the IRTC clears the market for inter-regional congestion management based on price signals exchanged with interconnected TSOs. The design of the IRTC makes the framework essentially independent of the type of market and the transmission tariffs in the regions within its boundaries.
An optimization problem that involves a system of interconnected power pools can now be formulated. Let be the set of the interconnected areas, be the total number of constraints that couple variables from different areas, and be the number of coupling constraints of area . If we assume that the objective function is separable with respect to the interconnected areas, then the problem can be decoupled. The problem is formulated in the subsequent subsection.
A. Mathematical Formulation
The main engine of the spot market is a decentralized OPF problem whose centralized formulation is as follows: minimize subject to (8) where is the set of interconnected TSOs; is a vector containing usual OPF-variables belonging to ; models the social welfare of area , measured as the difference of benefits minus costs (i.e., " "); is a vector that contains variables from area ; is a vector of nonlinear equations of the equality and inequality constraints belonging to ; and the equation models the power flow balances at frontier buses, where can be written as and is a vector with variables (voltages and power flows) associated with frontier buses, which are created to numerically isolated interconnected areas [15] .
The idea behind the approach proposed here is similar to the one presented in [14] . However, as opposed to the selective dualization technique presented in [14] or the decentralized approach, based on decomposition techniques, proposed in [20] , we propose a direct approach based on interior point methods. In this section, we propose an infeasible primal-dual interior point method to simulate a decentralized auction mechanism for the solution of (8) . We take advantage of the particular structure the problem shows and allow self-operation of the interconnected TSOs.
B. Derivation of the Algorithm
The first step in the primal dual interior point algorithm [21] is to introduce into the original problem (8) , nonnegative slack vectors in order to convert the inequalities constraints into equalities. The nonnegative conditions on the slack variables are then appended to the objective function by using a logarithmic barrier term, that is minimize subject to (9) where is the barrier parameter, and is the number of inequalities constraints associated with . The solution to the original problem (8) is obtained by solving a sequence of nonlinear problems of the form of (9) . The sequence of barrier parameters monotonically decreased to zero as iterations progress, and it generates a sequence of subproblems as formulated in (9) . The solution to these subproblems approaches , a stationary point of (8) .
If is a stationary point of (8), there exist vectors of Lagrange multipliers ( , ), associated with and , that satisfy the first-order Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [15] . The optimality conditions for this problem can be grouped into i) sets of local equations (optimality conditions with respect to , and ), each set associated with each power network; and ii) a global equation that couples variables of different system operators (optimality condition with respect to ).
The set of local optimality conditions is (10) together with the global restriction (11) where is the gradient of , is the Jacobian of , and and . The vector contains local variables associated with the power network and is an identity vector of appropriate dimension.
Instead of iteratively coordinating the solution of the system of nonlinear equations, the coordination is carried out in the linear system of equations that results from applying the Newton's method to (10) and (11) . Similar convergence behavior is maintained with respect to centralized auction mechanisms at a cost of an iterative exchange of information among TSOs. We take advantage of the iterative nature of the IP method to generate a sequence of price signals for the coordination of the different TSOs involved in the power exchanges.
At each iteration of the IP algorithm, one-step of the Newton's method is taken to compute the search directions of the nonlinear system of (10) and (11) . The resulting Newton's System is of the form (12) where , and . The residual vector is obtained by evaluating the left-hand side of (10), (11) at . The elements of the coefficient matrix in (12) 
The computational effort can be reduced to the solution of a sequence of linear system of equations. By reordering the coefficient matrix of (12), we obtain [15] . . .
Matrices s are built using the , , , matrices. The elements in are either 0 or 1; they take into account the topology of the interconnections; note that this matrix is constant at all iterations. The linear system of equations in (14) shows an appropriate structure for decentralized operation since it can be solved by block-decomposition. The decentralized solution of (14) is discussed next.
C. Price Updating: IRTC
The repeated solution of the system of linear (14) can be interpreted as a decentralized price driven auction. An auctioneer (the IRTC) receives information of system status of each . Based on this information and the status of tie-lines , the IRTC updates the prices at tie-lines by computing the equation (15) This expression is easily obtained by an elimination process in (14) . Once is calculated, the price vector is updated using (16) where is a parameter that is selected based on the information submitted by each (basically, it is updated so that the slack variables satisfy the positiveness condition). The IRTC acts as an auctioneer by sending a sequence of trial prices at tie-lines to the TSOs, who reacts to the sequence of prices sending a sequence of responses . The IRTC does not receive confidential competing data; the information provided to the IRTC does not represent an updated price bid and does not involve giving away any proprietary information on prices.
D. Optimal Response to Prices
At a given iteration , and given the new trial price , the optimal response of each system operator is given by (17) This equation is derived by back-substitution in (14) . The term makes progress toward optimality while trying to satisfy all network constraints.
The current point is computed so as to satisfy the maximum step size allowed for the strictly positive variables in the IP algorithm, that is (18) where is the step length parameter. The IRTC does not require bid supply functions explicitly. The complications of the iterative process described above are encapsulated in the coordination among TSOs, which is essentially a numerical solution procedure and not an iterative market.
Once the and variables are calculated, the barrier parameter is updated using (19) where is the number of inequalities constraints of the original problem (8) and is a centrality parameter [21] . At each iteration, the IRTC checks for convergence and the barrier parameter is updated. If conditions (10) and (11) are satisfied to a specified convergence criterion and the barrier parameter is , then the current primal-dual pair is a minimizer of the original NLP problem (8) . Otherwise, the process is repeated until the convergence criteria are achieved.
The algorithm can be summarized as follows.
Algorithm V.1 Decentralized IPM Algorithm
Step 0) Initialize all variables.
Step 1) The IRTC starts with an initial estimate of and broadcasts the first trial of spot prices at frontier buses. Choose and set .
Step 2) TSOs respond to prices at tie-lines, enforcing limits using (17) , (18) . Thus, they send to the IRTC.
Step 3) The IRTC updates prices and checks for convergence; if convergence is not achieved, set and return to Step 2.
E. Illustrative Example
Let us consider the two-area system described in Section VI-A. Assuming a joint (centralized ) dispatch of both systems, and taking into account the tie-line capacities, we obtain different spot prices that vary according to their location. These locational marginal prices (LMPs) [22] capture both the cost of energy and congestion and, thus, they are the correct signals to price congestion. The LMPs at tie-lines are the appropriate signals to manage inter-TSO congestion. The results obtained from a joint dispatch of system A and system B are displayed in Fig. 3 . It can be observed that tie-line 1-6 is at its maximum capacity but not so the tie-line 2-5. An alternative solution can be obtained by coordinating and . The same solution can be obtained by coordinating and with the auction mechanism described in Section V where generators 1 and 2 submit bids to , and generator 4 submits to . Each TSO schedules its power systems taking into account the power flows at tie-lines; in case of transmissionviolationsoccur,theystartacongestionmanagementprocedurewherethe IRTC is responsible for coordinating and pricing the power exchange at tie-lines.
The Lagrange multipliers associated with the power flows at tie-lines are the signals that the TSOs receive to drive coordination. The price vector is updated by the IRTC in terms of system status submitted by TSOs. Based on previous experience,theIRTCstartswithaninitialestimateoftheLMPsatfrontier buses7and8;forinstance, and . Then and react to these price signals and update the schedules trying to maximize their social welfare while enforcing limits. They send new patterns of power flows and to the IRTC. A new price vector is updated. The process is repeated until convergence criteria ( and ) are achieved. Convergence is obtained within eight iterations. The evolution of spot prices, generation outputs, and power flowimbalancesareshowninFig.4,where stands forbus .The spotpricesforgenerationanddemandbusesaretheLagrangemultipliers associated to the power flow equations. Spot prices at bus 7 and 8 are the signals that the IRTC sends to TSOs at each iteration. Power low imbalance at bus 7 and 8 show that the algorithm becomes stabilizedwithinthe first iterations. From Fig. 4 ,it canbe observed that self-operation of and yields the same electricalandeconomicoperatingpointasacentralizedoperation.
F. Computational Results on Larger Test Systems
Several case studies are considered to evaluate the proposed approach from a computational point of view. In order to evaluate theproposedapproaches,wecodedoptimizationalgorithmsusing Matlab and C programs, linked through mex files.
Extensive numerical simulations have been performed and most relevant results are presented on several case studies. These case studies are based on several IEEE power systems. The IEEE-based power systems builds on standard IEEE 14-, 24-, Table III . The first and second columns identify the test case and the corresponding IEEE-power system. The third and fourth columns denote number of interconnected subsystems and number of tie-lines. Columns five, six, and seven give the number of buses, generators, and branches, respectively. Market-related data (generators' bids, demands' bids, demand elasticity, etc.) sets were randomly generated. Each system is divided in different market areas as shown in Table III . Figures for these power systems range from six generators and 20 branches of the IEEE-14 bus test system, to 69 generators and 441 branches of the IEEE-300 bus test system.
The number of iterations required to achieve convergence for each test system is displayed in Table IV . The evolution of the normalizedsocialwelfareforasmalltestcaseDandformedium-sized test cases H and I are displayed in Fig. 5 ; these test cases achieved convergence within 15, 23, and 26 iterations, respectively. From  Fig.5 ,itcanbeobservedthataftertheveryfirstiterations,thealgorithmsmoothlyprogressestotheoptimum.Asexpected,thelarger the test system is, the larger the number of iterations to converge. Tables V, VI, and VII detail the convergence for test cases D, H, and I. Parameter is computed as the sum of barrier parameters of eacharea-subproblem; iscomputedasthemaximumsteplength for all area-subproblems; and is the maximum power flow mismatch of all area-subproblems. Practical aspects on the determination of and can be found in [21] .
VI. CONCLUSION
We have addressed the problem of inter-regional congestion management using an approach that avoids the mismatches between supply and demand on physical network resources that may happen in case an explicit auction for transmission capacity is implemented. The proposed approach considers a spot interregional market that requires a strong coordination among involved TSOs. The proposed optimization-based auction mechanism achieves system-wide efficiency of inter-regional markets while no confidential information needs to be exchanged. The interaction of adjacent TSOs is efficiently taken into account through a decentralized OPF using interior point methods.
Optimal dual variables, associated with power flows at tie-lines, are the signals that properly drive the auction mech- anism to achieve system-wide efficiency operation points. Coordinated self-operation of interconnected power systems, based on maximizing individual profits, yields the same electrical and economic operating points as if both TSOs were centrally operated.
